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Abstract
Considering the constant increases in Internet Of Things (IoT) smart home devices
prevalence, their ownership is likely to change. This introduces novel privacy issues.
Smart home devices store owner’s sensitive information, which needs to be handled
securely in case of change in device ownership. Currently employed smart home devices
cannot detect changes in their ownership, which raises a great number of privacy and
security issues. To address this problem, we propose a system called FoundIoT for
automatic detection of IoT device ownership change. FoundIoT provides a technique
to detect change of ownership based on device context, which is inferred by monitoring
wireless communication channels. Finally, we present a prototype implementation of
FoundIoT for the proposed automatic ownership change detection technique. We show
that FoundIoT achieves a satisfactory performance. The implementation is supported by
a wide range of IoT devices and demonstrates a high speed (up to 1 minute 39 seconds)
and 100% accuracy of ownership change detection.
Keywords Internet Of Things, Ownership Change, Smart Home
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1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The IoT is considered as the next step in the evolution of connected devices after
personal computers and portable devices. These systems include Smart Home
devices, wearables, connected cars, industrial IoT and others.
With different IoT ecosystems widespread, critical security and privacy concerns
arise and need to be addressed. Certain IoT devices have an ability to collect
private and confidential information about their owners, which raises a variety
of privacy and security issues. Such information include sensitive data, such
as user profile data, authentication details, network configuration settings and
credentials.
The current extensive prevalence of Smart Home devices has raised an issue of
ownership change. Such situations might happen in case of selling, borrowing or
even theft of IoT devices.
Ownership change can lead to leakage of the previous owner’s sensitive informa-
tion stored on the IoT device, as a new owner gains full access to it. Additionally,
the previous owner of the IoT device could have remote access to it, which can lead
to leakage of the new owner’s data stored on the device or its cloud storage.
Therefore, a technique for an IoT device to detect on its own if its owner has
changed is required to handle such situations in a secure manner.
1.2 Contributions
The major contributions of this work are:
• An automatic ownership change detection system called FoundIoT :
- Developing an automatic technique that allows the IoT device to scan its
vicinity for surrounding connected devices and detect changes in context
1
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using wireless communication channels (presented in Chapter 4).
• Data mining techniques:
- Developing data mining techniques applied to the collected wireless com-
munication data (presented in Chapter 5).
• A prototype implementation of the system:
- Developing a prototype implementation of the proposed system on the
Raspberry Pi 3 (presented in Chapter 6). We use Python programming
language for data formatting and analysis, and Bash scripting for scheduling
and data collection.
• Evaluation:
- Providing the system evaluation in terms of its performance and security
(presented in Chapter 7). The implemented prototype is able to detect
ownership change with 100% accuracy and speed up to 1 minute 39 seconds.
The prototype can be realized on a wide variety of off-the-shelf IoT devices
and provides partial resilience to adversaries. The complete resilience can
be achieved with existing techniques described in Section 7.5.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an
overview of IoT and smart home devices, and technical background to introduce the
software and technologies used in our solution. Chapter 3 presents the adversary
model for IoT device ownership change. We also discuss the requirements for the
proposed system to protect against the specified adversary. Chapter 4 provides
an overview of the proposed solution and also discusses its design and components.
Chapter 5 describes the details of ownership change detection. Chapter 6
provides the implementation details of the proposed solution. Chapter 7 presents
the evaluation of the system, by measuring its accuracy and speed of detection.
Chapter 8 discusses the related work. Finally, in Chapter 9, we conclude the
work and share thoughts on future development of the system.
2
2. Background
2.1 Internet Of Things (IoT)
IoT represents a general concept for the ability of network devices to sense and
collect data from the world around them, and interact with the physical world.
IoT devices share data across the Internet where it can be processed and utilized
for various purposes. IoT provides connectivity across devices used in everyday
routine, such as smartphones, washing machine, television set, microwave and
coffee maker. Generally, they are connected to the Internet, however some IoT
devices can also act as a gateway for other devices and connect directly to them.
IoT is a giant network connecting almost everything.
The term "Internet of Things" was firstly mentioned by Kevin Ashton, co-founder
and executive director of the Auto-ID Center at MIT, in 1999. He anticipated a
major potential for IoT technology, including the ability of computer systems to
automatically collect and analyze data with much higher accuracy compared to
manual human operations. This leads to cost and human error reduction and
provides up-to-date information on the state of analyzed environment. Currently,
IoT is involved in a vast variety of industries, such as transportation, agriculture,
health-care, security solutions and entertainment. One of the IoT industries with
rapidly increasing prevalence is "smart home".
Smart home is a convenient home setup where appliances and devices, such as
door locks, thermostats, home monitors, cameras and lights, can be automatically
controlled remotely from anywhere in the world through the Internet. All these
devices generally operate in home environments. Therefore, they deal with sensi-
tive personal data about their owners on a daily basis. This raises a vast variety
of security and privacy concerns and makes smart home devices the target for
attacks from an adversary [1].
3
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2.2 Communication technologies
IoT devices can be enabled with a vast array of technologies available to vendors.
Devices can use Near field communication (NFC) and Radio Frequency Identi-
fication (RFID) for low range communication (up to 50 cm); and WiFi, ZigBee,
Bluetooth, Bluetooth LE [2], Z-Wave [3], IoTivity [4] and Homekit [5] for medium
range (up 100 m). Each mentioned communication standard provides sufficient
connectivity for a device independently, which means that an IoT device can use
one of them or several of them.
The following sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 describe two prevalent communication
technologies used in IoT devices currently.
2.2.1 WiFi
WiFi is a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) technology that uses radio waves
to transmit data. It is based on IEEE 802.11 standards [6]. The IEEE 802.11
standard describes two wireless network modes: infrastructure and ad hoc. In
case of ad hoc operation mode, devices establish peer-to-peer communication
and exchange data directly, without any intermediate node. On the contrary,
infrastructure mode requires a special node in the network called Access Point
(AP) that all devices in the network connect to. It also serves as a communication
bridge between devices in local network and other nodes in the Internet.
In general, IoT devices enable infrastructure mode during initial configuration
and await connection request from a control device, which could be a smartphone,
tablet or laptop. The IoT device creates a personal wireless AP, and the control
device gets connected to it for establishing the communication and credentials
exchange. The control device provides information on itself and the base wireless
AP. Once the connection is configured, the IoT device disables its own AP and
switches to managed mode to connect to the base AP.
2.2.2 Bluetooth
Bluetooth is a short-range wireless communication technology that uses radio
signals to send and receive data. It was originally designed as a replacement for
cable connection for various Human Interface Devices (HIDs) and soon became
a widely adopted wireless connectivity solution. Bluetooth operates in the 2.4
GHz industrial, scientific, and medical band. The technology is maintained by the
Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG).
IoT devices use Bluetooth in different scenarios. First, it can be used as the
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primary communication channel. Second, Bluetooth is used for initial configura-
tion routines. In this case, it serves as a secondary communication channel and
is used for initial connection establishment. The control device acts as a master,
and the IoT device joins the network as a slave. Once the initial Bluetooth pairing
process is successfully completed, devices can exchange the necessary information
for future communication, such as WiFi network and cloud service credentials. If
the IoT device plays the role of a gateway, the control device can instruct it to form
another network for additional devices. In this network, the IoT device acts as a
master and other modules are connected to the network as slaves.
A major benefit of Bluetooth pairing procedures is that they are performed only
once, during the initial connection. After that, devices from one network trust
each other and can connect automatically for later communications.
2.3 Network Traffic Monitoring
Network traffic monitoring is the process of analyzing traffic patterns used for as-
sessing network performance, resource availability and security. Network monitor-
ing incorporates packet sniffing and capturing techniques and generally requires
inspecting each incoming and outgoing packet.
In order to analyze traffic, the Network Interface Card (NIC) should support
specific operation modes. A NIC is an electronic component that connects a
computer to a network. The NIC provides communication using specific physical
and data link layer standards, such as Ethernet and WiFi. This provides a base
for full network protocol stack, allowing communication among small groups
of computers on the same Local Area Network (LAN) and large-scale network
communication through routable protocols, such as Internet Protocol (IP). The
NIC allows computers to communicate over a computer network, either by using a
wired or wireless connection.
2.3.1 Network Card Operation Modes
In general, manufacturers provide the support for several operation modes to the
NIC. The card mode depends on the current tasks assigned to it.
Most network cards support the following operation modes:
Managed
Managed mode is sometimes referred to as client mode. It is the most
commonly used and supported operation mode among network cards. The
interface in managed mode requires a master to operate. It joins the network,
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and the device gets associated with it. Nodes in managed mode do not
communicate with each other directly, but only via the associated master.
Master
Master mode enables a wireless station to operate as an AP. It allows other
nodes to connect to the station and join its network.
Ad-hoc
Another commonly supported mode is ad-hoc. In this mode, wireless stations
create a direct peer-to-peer communication. Ad-hoc mode is used for tempo-
rary connection establishing and data exchange in cases of AP unavailability
or inoperability.
Monitor & Promiscuous
Finally, wireless cards support promiscuous and monitor mode functionality.
In these modes, the network card stops transmitting the data and starts
listening on a specific channel or devices connected to a local network. The
major difference is that promiscuous mode operates only when connected
to a wired or wireless LAN. It allows the card to sniff frames sent by other
members of a local network. On the other hand, the monitor mode does not
require a connection to an AP. The network card sniffs frames sent in any
nearby network on a specified frequency. In networks, such as Ethernet and
IEEE 802.11, each frame includes source and destination MAC addresses. In
managed mode, the NIC only accepts incoming frames that are addressed to
its MAC address and broadcast/multicast frames. Other frames are dropped.
In promiscuous/monitor mode, however, the NIC accepts all frames, thus
allowing the node to read frames intended for other machines and network
devices. Thus, promiscuous and monitor modes are very useful in network
monitoring and troubleshooting tasks. They are used to locate malfunctions
and abnormal activity in the network.
2.3.2 Monitoring Tools
As it was mentioned earlier, traffic monitoring is performed for network analysis
and security assessment. In order to analyze network traffic, specialized tools are
required.
One of the most popular Internet frames capturing tools is Tcpdump [7]. Tcp-
dump is an open source command-line tool for monitoring (sniffing) network traffic.
It is one of the most powerful tools for analyzing network traffic. Tcpdump works
by capturing and displaying packet headers and matching them against a set
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of filters. It understands boolean search operators and can use host names, IP
addresses, network names, and protocols as arguments.
Tcpdump operates in two modes. First, it can analyze traffic flow in real time,
displaying all packets that match a specified filter. This mode is useful for live
traffic analysis when it is required to constantly monitor traffic and register
expected behavior as soon as it happens.
Another mode is used for offline traffic analysis. Tcpdump can capture packets
and save them to a .pcap file. This mode allows to analyze a captured stream of
frames in detail, apply different filters and extract the required data. This data can
be used for many purposes such as security & forensic analyses, troubleshooting
& network administration or to understand and learn the network.
As an alternative, it may be more suitable to look at graphical tools, such as
Wireshark [8]. Such tools often provide a more workable tool-set for looking at
larger volumes of traffic. Wireshark also provides human readable filter building
tools that can be a time saver. However, it is computationally less efficient than
Tcpdump and is not usually used for automated tasks.
2.4 Context Awareness
Context awareness can be defined as the ability for a system or its components to
gather information about its environment at any given time and adapt its behavior
accordingly. Context includes any information that is relevant to a given entity,
such as a person, a device or an application. As such, a wide range of categories
including time, location, device, identity, activity and nearby devices/users fall
into the term of contextual information.
With the rapid development of IoT, the amount of devices that provide sensing
capabilities has increased. Most smart home devices are equipped with various
sensors that allow them to measure temperature, humidity and pressure; identify
location and identity of the user who requests access. A smart home device with
temperature sensor can detect variations of room temperature. Whenever a change
is detected, the device sends a request for adjusting temperature to the home
automation system.
Another example is related to data security. The ConXsense framework [9]
provides a context-aware control system for mobile devices. It classifies contexts
automatically with the use of context sensing and machine learning techniques
and adjusts the security and privacy-related properties.
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Figure 2.1. chownIoT Flow Diagram [10]
2.5 chownIoT system
Contextual information can be used to improve the system security. IoT devices
used in households contain owner’s sensitive information, which can be leaked or
stolen during ownership change.
The chownIoT system developed by Khan [10] presents a technique for secure
handling of smart home device ownership change. The author proposes a pri-
vacy protocol to tackle the issues of authentication and provides data protection
techniques, such as data encryption, to ensure the owner’s privacy. The protocol
ensures data privacy during ownership change by preserving owner’s contexts on
the device with encryption. It does not rely on any specific hardware dependencies.
Therefore, the system can be implemented on a variety of off-the-shelf devices.
chownIoT also describes an owner’s profile management scheme to effectively
manages ownership during the IoT device life cycle. To access or retrieve the
profile, the user needs to present proper credentials. The scheme also provides a
simple and reliable technique to transfer device ownership. This could be useful
in case of device lending for a limited time.
Figure 2.1 describes the main steps of chownIoT. Once the system is set up, it
launches the ownership change detection procedure. If the ownership change is
detected, chownIoT tests the current context by searching for a trusted device in
the vicinity and sending a challenge to it.
If the system receives a valid response to the challenge, it creates a new context
for the current owner. Otherwise, chownIoT locks the profile and starts looking for
a new control device. Once it is found, the smart home device provides a list of
available profiles to it.
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When a new control device accesses the IoT device, chownIoT provides it with
a list of encrypted user profiles and an option to create a new profile. A new
user can choose an existing profile or create a new one. If the user attempts to
access an existing profile, the IoT device verifies it with the credential mechanism
set up by profile owner. The system support for trusted and new control devices
allows a convenient access to the IoT device and improves the usability. At the
same time, the differentiation between trusted and new control devices provides a
fine-grained access to the smart home device.
2.6 Technical Background
This section provides an overview of software and hardware solutions used in
implementation of the project.
2.6.1 Raspberry Pi
A Raspberry Pi [11] is a credit card-sized computer created by Eben Upton, the
founder of the Raspberry PI Foundation, and originally designed for education.
The creator’s goal was to help students improve programming skills and hardware
awareness. However, it became extremely popular among beginner developers,
enthusiasts and researchers thanks to its low price and small size.
The Raspberry Pi was originally designed for the Linux-based operating systems,
and many Linux distributions now have a version optimized for it. Two of the
most popular options are Raspbian and Pidora, which are based on the Debian
and Fedora operating systems, respectively.
The Raspberry Pi is a resource-constrained device, however it provides all
features of a common Linux machine. Several generations of Raspberry PI were
released to the market. The latest available one is the 3rd generation of Raspberry
PI. The major difference of current generation is the support of on board Bluetooth
and WiFi adapters, which are widely used in most IoT devices.
2.6.2 Bash scripting
Bash [12] is a command line interface for interacting with the operating system.
It is widely used on a vast variety of GNU/Linux distributions and Unix systems,
such as Mac OS X. Bash shell was created by the Free Software Foundation in the
late 1980s and was intended as a free software alternative to the Bourne shell. It
provided all the features of this shell and introduced new features, such as integer
arithmetic and job control.
9
Background
Bash provides several modes of execution to the user. In the interactive mode,
the shell gives immediate feedback for user input. In addition, Bash provides
command scripting mode, also known as Bash shell scripting. In this mode,
the user can create complex programs that consist of various commands and
constructs, including loops, conditions and functions.
Bash scripts are widely used in administrative and scheduling tasks as well.
These tasks can be launched automatically, depending on various conditions, such
as system boot, specific user input, system or network event.
2.6.3 Python
Python [13] is an object-oriented, high-level programming language. It provides
clean and readable syntax that makes it easy to learn.
Additionally, Python supports modularity and packaging. This allows to create
Python modules that can be used as external packages across various projects.
Python provides straightforward techniques for adding and integrating new mod-
ules to the existing applications.
Another benefit of Python is the free of charge availability of the interpreter
and standard libraries. Python and all necessary dependencies are available on
all major platforms. Thus, it is widely used in various projects by developers,
manufacturers and researchers for low-cost prototype development and research
projects.
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3. Problem Statement
In this chapter, we specify the problem that we are aiming to solve. It relates
to various potential threats during the ownership change process. Section 3.1
gives the description of the problem, Section 3.2 outlines the adversary model and
finally, Section 3.3 specifies system requirements for mitigating identified threats.
3.1 Description
In Chapter 1, we mentioned the aspect of personal data handling by IoT devices.
Typically, smart home devices store various sensitive information, including device
readings, owner’s account preferences and network credentials. In most cases, this
sensitive information is stored in the device memory and on its cloud platform
with no proper security mechanisms [14]. This introduces various threats against
sensitive information related to the owner.
IoT device ownership might change if the current owner decides to sell or lend
it. Such situations raise a variety of security questions, such as the device ability
to detect ownership change and protect the previous owner’s data stored in its
memory and the cloud service. Device also needs to establish proper access control
rules for both parties: the previous owner and the new one.
Inadequate security measures for mitigating potential threats provide a possi-
bility for an attacker to gain access to the owner’s sensitive information. Thus,
an automatic ownership change detection algorithm is required for IoT devices.
Its primary objective is to detect the ownership change and take appropriate
measures for mitigating possible attacks on the previous owner’s personal data.
Potential attackers in ownership change situations are the previous owner and
a new owner of the device located in various environments. Hence, our solution
needs to differentiate and identify different ownership change scenarios to apply
proper threat mitigation in each case.
Ownership change could happen in three major scenario categories: selling a
11
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device, lending a device for a limited amount of time and device stealing. We specify
potential threats for the IoT device ownership change process by performing the
adversary modeling.
A system for secure handling of the contextual data stored on the smart home de-
vice has already been described by Khan in his MSc Thesis [10]. His work focused
on protecting the device owner’s privacy and specifying owner’s profile manage-
ment scheme to improve security of the device during its life cycle. Meanwhile,
our work is focused on another part in the device ownership management, the
detection of change in ownership. While Khan presented a simple detection tech-
nique in his thesis, we propose an advanced automatic mechanism for ownership
change detection to provide a proper level of security to the system.
3.2 Adversary Model
This section specifies the adversary model for smart home IoT device ownership
change by presenting attacker goals, attack surface and capabilities of a potential
attacker who is attempting to perform malicious activities targeted on the system.
Attacker goals: The primary objective of an attacker is to gather sensitive data
stored on the IoT device or its cloud storage. This data includes AP credentials
that are saved in the smart home device storage, and collected sensoric data that
is sent to the control device or a cloud storage.
Attack surface: Due to lack of proper security mechanisms, IoT devices provide
an extensive attack surface. We focus on the most critical part of it, which composes
the primary set of vulnerabilities.
Device Memory
Generally, IoT devices store sensitive owner’s data (usernames and pass-
words, third-party and network credentials, encryption keys, and information
collected by the device) in their local storage in an insecure manner and pro-
vide no tools for data integrity checking. Furthermore, smart home devices
are shipped with hardcoded credentials for ease of setup [15].
Cloud storage
Some smart devices provide cloud service functionality. Owners can access
data and control their smart home devices remotely. Cloud services that
provide basic security techniques leave the possibility for a great number of
remote web attacks open for adversaries.
Device Web Interface
Some IoT devices provide a web interface for accessing its features and local
12
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device management. Some web interfaces lack proper security mechanisms,
leading to the possibility of various vulnerabilities, including SQL injections,
cross-site scripting, username enumeration and account lockout. Costin et
al. [14] performed the analysis of popular IoT firmware distributions and
reported that 24% of the web interfaces provide serious vulnerabilities.
Attacker capabilities: Our threat model considers a new owner and the previ-
ous owner of the device as potential attackers. During ownership change, a new
owner receives full control on the acquired device. A new owner can attempt to
steal the data stored in the device memory, by simulating the previous owner’s
environment. This can be achieved by spoofing the wireless network settings and
mislead the system security mechanisms, which will result in the previous owner’s
sensitive data leakage. Due to direct physical access to the device, a new owner is
able to directly extract data stored in the local memory. Apart from these, a new
owner can intercept the device network activity and control its communication. In
contrast, the previous owner can access the data stored in the IoT device cloud
storage remotely, as he knows the cloud credentials of the device. In addition,
some IoT devices provide the functionality of remote management and control,
which can be exploited by the previous owner of the device.
3.3 Requirements
The prime objective of this project is to design a technique for automatic IoT device
ownership change detection. The proposed solution should automatically detect
ownership change and provide an adequate accuracy.
In this section, we set requirements for the proposed solution.
R1 - Deployability
The goal of the project is to develop a universal automatic ownership change
detection system for IoT devices. Thus, the proposed solution needs to be
supported by a wide range of IoT devices.
R2 - Efficient execution under resource constraints
Most IoT devices provide limited computing resources. The system should
operate on devices with limited resources and should not lead to high system
load. The set of minimum hardware specifications is listed below. They are
based on Tessel 2 development board [16].
• RAM: from 64 MB
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• CPU: from 500 MHz
• Persistent storage: from 32 MB
R3 - Performance
R3.1 - Accuracy
The system needs to detect ownership change with at least 95% accuracy
and false positive rate lower than 1%.
R3.2 - Speed
The solution needs to detect ownership change during the IoT device
initial setup process, which typically takes up to 2 minutes [17].
The specified performance criteria inversely correlate with each other. Achiev-
ing more accurate results will lead to decrease in speed. Thus, the proposed
solution should balance these criteria in order to provide adequate perfor-
mance.
R4 - Security
The proposed solution needs to be resilient to the adversary model described
in Section 3.2. The solution should prevent attacker attempts of detection
disruption, by mitigating spoofing of network settings and collected data
stored on the device.
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4.1 Solution Overview
In Chapter 3, we identified security threats that might occur during ownership
change of an IoT device. In addition, we determined the requirements to achieve
proper system accuracy. Now, we describe a new system called FoundIoT (Owner-
ship Change Detection system) aimed to mitigate the security issues of ownership
change and reach the specified requirements. FoundIoT provides a reliable tech-
nique that detects device ownership change in an automatic manner. The complete
system consists of two components: FoundIoT and chownIoT [10]. FoundIoT pro-
vides the functionality of automatic ownership change detection for the IoT device.
chownIoT manages ownership change by ensuring data integrity and providing
user privacy enhancements.
FoundIoT is integrated in the IoT device itself. It allows the device to detect
change of its owner on its own. The device does not require any additional, external
tools to detect ownership change.
FoundIoT assumes changes in context to detect ownership change of an IoT
device. We define context as a set of active wireless nodes that send or transmit
data in the device vicinity. This wireless activity characterizes the IoT device
context.
The flow diagram of FoundIoT is depicted in Figure 4.1. During the first stage,
the system collects data about the IoT device context, it identifies every network
connected device in its vicinity. FoundIoT collects the contextual data periodically
and saves captured data in a time series format. Each observation consists of
timestamp and the collected context at the corresponding time.
Once the data is collected, the system proceeds to the next stage and applies
analysis on the captured data. The objective of this stage is to detect ownership
change of the IoT device based on changes of its context. IoT devices are usually
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Figure 4.1. FoundIoT System Overview
deployed in a single physical location while they belong to a specific owner. The
IoT device context characterizes its location. If the IoT device is moved to another
location, its context will change. Therefore, the device context can be used to
detect change of its location, which in most cases means change of its ownership.
If the IoT device is moved to a new location while preserving the same owner,
the device owner will be at this new location and his other devices will likely be
there too, which means that the IoT device context will not change.
For each captured context, FoundIoT computes the value of a metric that char-
acterizes changes of the IoT device context. In case there is no ownership change,
the value of the metric stays above the detection threshold. Decision on ownership
change is made by detecting a continuous interval of metric values, lower than
the detection threshold. If ownership change is detected, FoundIoT sends a signal
to chownIoT to manage ownership change.
FoundIoT provides a multistage ownership change detection technique depicted
in Figure 4.2. The first phase consists in detecting contextual changes based on
Wireless Station (STA) in the device vicinity. If no change is detected, FoundIoT
starts the AP detection procedure. This provides information about the set of
active APs that announce their operation to STAs in the IoT device vicinity. The
final phase checks for changes in context among Bluetooth enabled devices.
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Figure 4.2. FoundIoT Ownership Change Detection Flow Diagram
4.2 Design Choices
The detection of ownership change can be achieved with various tools and tech-
niques. This section presents the technologies and techniques chosen in FoundIoT
implementation.
4.2.1 Context Identification
Smart home devices are equipped with various sensors, which can be used for
scanning their environment. Smart thermostats use temperature and humidity
sensors, smart home security systems provide cameras and proximity sensors.
The proposed solution is intended to support a wide range of smart home devices.
Because of that, we cannot rely on uncommon sensor modalities and technologies
for our implementation. This design choice is dictated by requirement R1, which
is stated in Section 3.3.
To capture the context, the device needs to scan the network to detect connected
devices in its vicinity. In general, IoT devices support diverse communication tech-
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nologies, which could be used for establishing a connection and detecting device
context. Some of the most widespread communication protocols are described in
Section 2.2.
We base our solution on WiFi and Bluetooth for context identification and own-
ership change detection. This provides support of wide range of IoT devices.
The choice to limit scanning techniques with these two specific communication
channels involves a trade-off between requirements R1 and R3.
4.2.2 Data recording
We store the collected data in a time series format. Time series implies having
data with timestamps for each observation. This format is useful for analysis of
processes that change over time.
When change of ownership happens, the system detects changes in the device
context. It is important to identify specific points in time when the changes take
place. Time series format can provide the system with required information, such
as the timestamp of ownership change happening. Thus, time series format is
beneficial for detection of ownership change.
4.2.3 Multistage Ownership Change Detection
FoundIoT provides a multistage protection scheme. This feature is implemented
for mitigation of adversary attacks to disrupt the system detection method. It is
rather easy for an adversary to spoof one of available ownership change detection
methods. That is why detecting changes, using one specific method, is unreliable
to make the decision on possible ownership change.
Figure 4.2 describes the multistage structure of FoundIoT . The system uses three
different sequential checks to detect ownership change. Therefore, it increases
FoundIoT resilience to adversary actions and provides more reliable assessment
of contextual changes. This choice is justified by requirement R3.1, declared in
Section 3.3.
4.2.4 Statistical analysis
Device contextual changes are analyzed using statistical techniques. Statistics
helps improve reliability of the technique, decreasing the number of false alarms
and mitigating adversary attempts to disrupt the system detection methods.
This design choice helps to achieve requirement R4.
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4.3 Components
FoundIoT requires 4 components depicted in Figure 4.3.
WiFi context monitor
This component captures MAC addresses of STAs and APs in the device
vicinity. Its design is described in Section 4.3.1. WiFi context monitor
component generates a Tcpdump[7] pool of data, which is passed over to
Time Series Generator.
Bluetooth context monitor
This component captures MAC addresses of Bluetooth enabled devices in
device vicinity. Its design is described in Section 4.3.2. The list of captured
MAC addresses is passed over to Time Series Generator.
Time Series Generator
Time Series Generator component prepares the data for its analysis. Its
design is described in Section 4.3.3. The data gets converted into time series
format with timestamped labels and passed over to Ownership Change
Detection component.
Ownership Change Detection
The final component analyzes the time series data and detects ownership
change of the IoT device. Its design is described in Section 5. The analysis
is performed for each type of captured context: WiFi (STA and AP) and
Bluetooth. Finally, the results are sent over to chownIoT for ownership
change management.
Figure 4.3. FoundIoT Components
4.3.1 WiFi context monitor
The initial steps of WiFi context monitor are focused on scanning the device
vicinity and capturing wireless traffic of STAs. The component performs two types
of scanning procedures. At first, WiFi context monitor component scans the local
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network in promiscuous mode. This scan identifies the MAC addresses of STAs
that operate in the same WiFi network as the IoT device.
Afterwards, the component makes another scan in monitor mode. It captures
wireless traffic and identify MAC addresses of STAs in the IoT device vicinity by
detecting network frames sent and transmitted by STAs on a specific frequency.
That is why WiFi context monitor component dynamically changes frequency of
the network card adapter to capture packets from every STA in the IoT device
vicinity. The set of frequencies is limited by the wireless channels supported by
the network card manufacturer.
Scans performed on each wireless frequency provide different insight on current
context. That is why the component performs each scan with distinct duration.
Different values of scan duration and their impact on detection accuracy and
system performance are evaluated in Chapter 7.
AP detection is performed via Beacon capturing. Beacon is a management frame
in IEEE 802.11 standard [6]. APs transmit these frames periodically to announce
their service to STAs. Beacons frames are extracted from monitor mode scan
results.
4.3.2 Bluetooth context monitor
Bluetooth context monitor component performs scans using standard Bluetooth
discovery features of the IoT device. It launches Bluetoothctl tool [18] to scan for
Bluetooth enabled devices in the vicinity.
Bluetoothctl provides basic mechanisms of Bluetooth pairing, establishing con-
nection between devices. It lists the devices that are discovered in the device
vicinity by recording their MAC addresses. Bluetooth context monitor component
stores the discovered MAC addresses with a timestamp of their discovery.
4.3.3 Time Series Generator
After the wireless activity capture procedure is complete, the system receives
unformatted data about captured WiFi and Bluetooth devices. It needs to be
transformed into a specific format to apply required analysis techniques.
FoundIoT transforms the captured stream of data to time series format. Each
observation is assigned with a unique identifier, the timestamp of when it was
discovered. This allows to put each observation on the timeline, analyze the
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resulting sequence and extract its features.
{TS1 : [{TS1.1,MAC1.1} . . . {TS1.m,MAC1.m}],
TS2 : [{TS2.1,MAC2.1} . . . {TS2.k,MAC2.k}],
...
TSN : [{TSN.1,MACN.1} . . . {TSN.l,MACN.l}]}
(4.1)
The data is formatted according to the format depicted in Equation 4.1. Each
observation consists of several pairs of device MAC address and the timestamp of
its discovery.
As a result, Time Series Generator component creates 3 time series: TSSTA,
TSAP , and TSBluetooth for discovered STAs, APs and Bluetooth devices.
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5. Ownership Change Detection
This chapter specifies the chosen techniques and algorithms for the analysis of
collected time series data structure. The output from these methods is used for
identifying points in time of possible device ownership change.
5.1 Time Series Analysis
Ownership Change Detection component receives 3 time series from Time Series
Generator component, described in Section 4.3.3. The first time series TSSTA
contains information about active STAs. We differentiate local and external
devices. We define local devices as those which are connected to the same (local)
WiFi network as the IoT device. Therefore, external devices do not belong to the
local network and are connected to other APs. Each examined observation consists
of two subsets: local and external devices, which are generated by promiscuous
and monitor scanning procedures, respectively.
The second time series TSAP contains information about nearby APs. As for
TSSTA time series, TSAP contains two types of devices: local and external APs.
The local AP is defined as the AP to which the IoT device is connected to. All other
discovered APs are defined as external ones.
The third time series TSBluetooth contains information about Bluetooth devices
in the IoT device vicinity.
All mentioned time series are analyzed, using a metric that evaluates similarity
of observations within each time series. To evaluate similarity of time series, we
need to choose an appropriate metric for our data. In the following sections 5.1.1
and 5.1.2, we describe two metrics that can be used for similarity evaluation of
our time series.
22
Ownership Change Detection
5.1.1 Jaccard Index
Jaccard Index [19] compares members of two sets to identify shared and distinct
members. It is a measure of similarity for two datasets in range [0, 1]. The higher
the value is, the more similar analyzed datasets are.
Several prior research works [20], [21] used Jaccard Index previously for wireless
context comparison. Jaccard Index is effective in calculating similarity of data
objects that have binary attributes, it can be applied to our collected data. Each
FoundIoT scan observation consists of the set of detected wireless devices. A
device could either be detected or not due to its wireless inactivity.
Jaccard Index provides proper results for sets of different cardinality. It is
achieved by normalizing the score by union of analyzed sets. Without this normal-
ization, small sets would always have very low scores, which negatively affects the
accuracy of similarity computations.
Jaccard Index of two sets A and B is expressed as:
JaccardIndex(A,B) =
|A⋂B|
|A⋃B| (5.1)
FoundIoT performs the analysis of the collected contexts periodically, each 10
minutes. Each scan is assigned with the timestamp scantimestamp of when it was
performed.
On each analysis iteration, the value of Jaccard Index gets computed based on
the sets of all previous and the current scans. The system composes the union of
MAC addresses of devices discovered prior to the current scan. The resulted set,
Setprev, consists of unique MAC addresses of devices that were discovered during
[scantimestamp1 ...scantimestampN−1] scanning procedures.
Next, the system computes the intersection and union of Setprev with the set
Setcurr that contains MAC addresses of devices discovered during the current scan
scantimestampN . The Jaccard Index metric value for the current scan is computed,
according to the following equation:
JaccardIndexscantimestampN =
|Setprev
⋂
Setcurr|
|Setprev
⋃
Setcurr| =
=
|∪timestampN−1i=timestamp1 scani
⋂
scantimestampN |
|∪timestampN−1i=timestamp1 scani
⋃
scantimestampN |
(5.2)
FoundIoT computes the Jaccard Index value for each observation within re-
ceived datasets. Computed values are added to TSJaccardIndex that represent the
similarity of TSSTA, TSAP , and TSBluetooth.
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5.1.2 Kullback-Leibler divergence
The Kullback-Leibler divergence [22], [23] is a measure of how two probability
distributions diverge. Kullback-Leibler divergence gives a value in the range [0,
1]. The greater the value is, the more divergent distributions are. Low values of
Kullback-Leibler divergence indicate similar distributions.
The Kullback-Leibler divergence is used in a variety of fields, including mathe-
matical statistics, evaluating relative entropy in information systems, randomness
and similarity in time series sequences. Lee et al. [24] used KL Divergence metric
for time series clustering, and Liu [25] used it for change-point detection in time
series.
Kullback-Leibler divergence of two distributions P and Q is defined by Equation
5.3.
DKL(P ||Q) =
N∑
i=1
P (i) ∗ log Pi
Qi
(5.3)
The value of Kullback-Leibler divergence gets computed based on the same two
datasets, as the Jaccard index: Setprev, which consists of MAC addresses of all
discovered devices during [scantimestamp1 ...scantimestampN−1], and Setcurr with MAC
addresses from current observation.
During each analysis iteration, FoundIoT computes the number of occurrences of
each MAC address from the analyzed scan period [scantimestamp1 ...scantimestampN−1].
To compute the number of device occurrences, we define a function f(MACdevice,
SetMAC) in Equation 5.4, which takes two parameters. The first parameter is MAC
address of the analyzed device. The second parameter is a set of MAC addresses
SetMAC .
The function returns 1 if MACdevice is present in SetMAC . In other cases, the
function returns 0.
f(MACdevice, SetMAC) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩1, if MACdevice ∈ SetMAC0, else (5.4)
During each scantimestampN , FoundIoT computes the sum of values of the function
defined in Equation 5.4 for each device from Setprev. The resulted value is divided
by the number of scans N − 1 to compute the device occurrence in Setprev.
The occurrence value is used to assign weight WeightMACdevice for each discovered
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device from Setprev:
WeightMACdevice =
N−1∑
i=1
f(MACdevice, SetMACi)
N − 1 (5.5)
The first step of computing divergence between sets Setprev and Setcurr is the
computation of occurrence weights Weightoccurrence for each device from the inter-
section of the sets (Equation 5.6).
Weightoccurrence =
WeightMACdevice∑M
i=1WeightMACdevicei
, (5.6)
where M is the size of intersection |Setprev
⋂
Setcurr|.
We assign occurrence weights Weightoccurrence for each MAC address from the
intersection Setprev
⋂
Setcurr based on its occurrence in Setprev and normalized
weights Weightnormalized = 1|Setprev ⋂Setcurr| based on the size of the intersection.
The equation for Kullback-Leibler divergence for FoundIoT has the following
form:
DKL(Setprev||Setcurr)scantimestampN =
∑M
i=1Weightoccurrencei ∗ log
Weightoccurrencei
Weightnormalized
(5.7)
We are using both described metrics for similarity evaluation of the IoT device
context to compare FoundIoT detection performance with each of them.
The main advantage of Kullback-Leibler divergence over Jaccard Index metric
is its ability to assign weights for each device, based on its occurrence. The higher
the device occurrence is, the greater its impact on the divergence value is. As
a result, devices that belong to a different context should significantly decrease
the similarity score. KL Divergence is supposed to provide more accurate results
and fit any scenario. However, it will require more computations to compute the
occurrence of each device compared to Jaccard Index, which does not take into
account the occurrence of devices.
On the contrary, Jaccard Index metric assigns equal weights to discovered
devices and computes the similarity score with lower number of computations. It
is supposed to provide more accurate results in case of contexts with devices with
stable occurrence. Therefore, both metrics has their advantages and disadvantages
due to their technique of the similarity score computation.
Chapter 7 provides a detailed evaluation of the impact of each similarity metric
on FoundIoT performance.
25
Ownership Change Detection
5.2 Captured Data Filtering
STAs do not use wireless communication channels constantly. The connection is
established per request from the device and stays open until the AP forces it to
renew the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) lease.
It means that some STAs will not be present in the analyzed observation due to
their network inactivity or outdated DHCP lease. Such devices cause misleading
decreases of the similarity score.
That is why, FoundIoT sets the ignore limit ∆Ignore for STAs with low network
activity. These could be stationary devices, which require occasional network
activity for their operation or portable devices that are present in the network
for a short-term time. These devices get excluded from the analysis to reduce the
number of false alarms.
During each scantimestampN , FoundIoT computes the number of occurrences
of each device from period [scantimestamp1 ...scantimestampN−1]. If it is lower than
∆ignore, then it gets ignored during the current analysis iteration. Afterwards,
FoundIoT computes the sum of values of function depicted in Equation 5.4 for each
MACdevice from Setprev. The resulted value is divided by the number of scans N −1
to compute the occurrence of MACdevice in Setprev, which is depicted in Equation
5.8.
N−1∑
i=1
f(MACdevice, observationi)
N − 1 <= ∆ignore (5.8)
The parameter ∆ignore sets a lower bound for device occurrence. The higher it is,
the more devices with low network activity get excluded from analysis during the
current iteration.
5.3 Analysis Conclusions
Ownership Change Detection component studies the evolution of similarity metrics
changes over consecutive scans. It detects decreases of Jaccard Index values and
increases of KL divergence, which correspond to lower similarity. When the system
detects a long-term continuous interval of Jaccard Index similarity scores lower
than ∆JaccardIndex, it indicates a possible ownership change situation. For KL
divergence, we need to detect a long-term continuous interval with similarity
scores greater than ∆KL divergence.
To detect a continuous interval of low Jaccard Index similarity scores, we de-
fine a function f(ScoreJaccardIndex,∆JaccardIndex) in Equation 5.9. It returns 1 if
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the passed Jaccard Index similarity score is lower than the detection threshold
∆JaccardIndex. In other cases, it returns 0.
f(ScoreJaccardIndex,∆JaccardIndex) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩1, if ScoreJaccardIndex < ∆JaccardIndex0, else
(5.9)
To detect a continuous interval of high KL divergence similarity scores, we define
another function f(ScoreKL Divergence,∆KL Divergence) in Equation 5.10. It returns 1
if the passed KL divergence similarity score is greater than the detection threshold
∆KL Divergence. In other cases, it returns 0.
f(ScoreKL Divergence,∆KL Divergence) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩1, if ScoreKL Divergence > ∆KL Divergence0, else
(5.10)
Ownership Change Detection condition is depicted in Equation 5.11. FoundIoT
detects change of ownership when the number of consecutive similarity scores
exceeds the window W .
N∑
i=1
f(Scoresimilarityi ,∆similarity) >=W (5.11)
The system consecutively analyzes each TS: TSSTA, TSAP and TSBluetooth, and
checks if Ownership Change Detection condition is respected. By analyzing TSSTA
and TSAP , FoundIoT checks for changes in local and external WiFi contexts
captured in each TS. By analyzing TSBluetooth, FoundIoT checks for changes in
Bluetooth context. In case the Ownership Change Detection condition is respected
during the analysis of one of TS, the system indicates the detection of ownership
change and does not check the remaining TS.
The parameters ∆similarity (Jaccard Index or KL Divergence metric) and W affect
the system detection accuracy. ∆similarity sets the detection threshold for similarity
score that indicates changes in device context, and therefore ownership change of
the IoT device.
W sets a window of low similarity scores used to filter out temporary decreases in
similarities between the observations. Thus, these parameters affect the number
of false alarms and detection sensitivity.
False Positive (FP)
A false alarm or false positive is an event, where FoundIoT detects ownership
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change while it did not actually happen;
False Negative (FN)
A false negative is an event, where FoundIoT does not detect ownership
change while it actually happened;
True Positive (TP)
A true positive is an event, where FoundIoT detects ownership change while
it actually happened;
True Negative (TN)
A true negative is an event, where FoundIoT does not detect ownership
change while it did not actually happen.
The false positive rate is computed according to Equation 5.12, which presents
the ratio between the number of negative events incorrectly identified as positive
and the total number of actual negative events.
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
(5.12)
Detection sensitivity (also called the true positive rate) measures the propor-
tion of positives that are correctly identified as such. This metric evaluates the
FoundIoT efficiency. It gives the score of how many actual ownership change
events were detected correctly. The formula for true positive rate is presented in
Equation 5.13.
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
(5.13)
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6. Implementation
In chapters 4 and 5, we have provided a detailed description of the design choices
and components of the proposed solution. This chapter provides an overview of
FoundIoT prototype implementation.
As it was mentioned in Section 4.3, FoundIoT requires WiFi context monitor,
Bluetooth context monitor, Time Series Generator and Ownership Change Detec-
tion components. Therefore, we need to implement WiFi and Bluetooth context
monitoring, time series generation and analysis techniques. Apart from these, we
also need a platform for implementing the smart home device functionality.
The following sections provide the implementation description for each FoundIoT
component and the prototype IoT device.
6.1 Smart Home Device
IoT devices are designed to implement various functionality. Because of that,
vendors provide diverse software and hardware specifications and capabilities to
manufactured IoT devices. In addition, most vendors do not provide open source
programming specifications with IoT devices due to business requirements.
To implement a prototype of FoundIoT , we need an IoT testbed device. We have
chosen Raspberry Pi 3 [11] development board running on Raspbian Jessie OS
[26] for our implementation as it represents a typical IoT device:
• It provides similar capabilities (WiFi and Bluetooth connectivity);
• It is a low cost device as most off-the-shelf IoT devices.
In addition, it supports a variety of modern programming languages, including
Python and command-line tools, such as Tcpdump [7] and Bluetoothctl, which are
used for the prototype implementation of FoundIoT .
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6.2 WiFi Context Monitoring
FoundIoT uses onboard WiFi chip capabilities to scan the IoT device vicinity
and monitor the WiFi context. One of the most popular traffic monitoring tools
is Tcpdump. It is widely supported in modern operating systems and provides
required functionality for capturing STAs wireless traffic. FoundIoT launches
the Tcpdump capture, monitors wireless activity and saves the collected network
trace to a .pcap [27] file. The resulted file contains network frames, including
source and destination MAC addresses of communicating nodes, timestamps and
encrypted data. Next, FoundIoT filters out source MAC addresses on outgoing
network frames and timestamps from the trace and saves them to a .txt file.
To capture APs in the IoT device vicinity, we use Linux standard iwlist [28]
utility. It invokes the device standard WiFi discovery mechanisms and prints out
all available nearby APs. FoundIoT extracts the list of MAC addresses of nearby
APs from iwlist output and saves it with the timestamp to a .txt file.
6.3 Bluetooth Context Monitoring
To capture the Bluetooth context, FoundIoT uses standard Bluetooth discovery
tools of the device. In our case, Bluetoothctl tool represents base functionality
of the IoT device Bluetooth discovery mode. Bluetoothctl provides the list of
nearby Bluetooth active devices and can be used on a variety of modern Linux
distributions.
FoundIoT launches Bluetoothctl to capture MAC addresses of Bluetooth devices
in the IoT device vicinity and saves the list of their MAC addresses to a .txt file.
6.4 Time Series Generation
After FoundIoT captures WiFi and Bluetooth contexts, it needs to format the data
to time series for analysis.
We use Python programming language for context formatting. It provides a vari-
ety of useful tools and libraries for transforming raw context data into JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) structure that represents time series in our case.
We implement time series generation in Python using JSON library [29]. We
use collected WiFi and Bluetooth raw contexts with timestamps as the input
parameters. JSON library formats the collected contexts and generates a JSON
structure where timestamps represent keys of records and collected contexts -
records. The resulted structure represents collected WiFi and Bluetooth contexts
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in a time series format.
6.5 Time Series Analysis
The analysis of time series is performed using Python Scipy [30] and Scikit-learn
[31] libraries. These libraries provide implementations of Jaccard Index and KL
Divergence metrics used by FoundIoT for context similarity evaluation.
FoundIoT invokes jaccard_similarity_score function, which is a part of Python
Scikit-learn library during each scan iteration and passes sets of previously discov-
ered and current MAC addresses as input parameters to it. The value provided by
jaccard_similarity_score function represents the Jaccard Index similarity score of
sets of MAC addresses.
The computation of KL Divergence metric value is provided by Scipy library.
FoundIoT invokes scipy.stats.entropy function that calculates the entropy of a
distribution for given probability values. FoundIoT provides occurrence and
normalized weights of MAC addresses as input parameters to the entropy func-
tion. The resulted value represents the KL Divergence score of sets of previously
discovered and current MAC addresses.
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7. Evaluation
The chapter evaluates the described system features and components based on
the identified requirements in Section 3.3. We evaluate deployability, resource
constraints, accuracy, speed and security of FoundIoT in detail.
7.1 Deployability
In this section, we evaluate the deployability of FoundIoT .
Software limitations: FoundIoT uses C++, Python and shell scripting to imple-
ments the main features of ownership change detection. These software packages
and technologies are widely supported by most modern operating systems. Thus,
the proposed system can be deployed in any modern operating system.
Hardware limitations: FoundIoT does not depend on any particular hardware
component. It uses wireless communication channels, such as WiFi and Bluetooth,
for its operation. It can be implemented on a wide range of devices that support
wireless communication, which is a required component for a smart home device.
Sensor limitations: FoundIoT uses wireless adapters for detection of own-
ership change. Currently, the system uses WiFi and Bluetooth adapters. The
set of supported adapters can be easily expanded for improving the accuracy of
ownership change detection on a specific device. Thus, the system can be deployed
on devices with any number of sensor modalities.
As a result, the implemented prototype of FoundIoT can be deployed on a wide
range of IoT devices, as it is based on widely supported software and hardware
solutions, and it does not depend on sensor modalities that are specific for a limited
number of IoT devices. The requirement R1 is fully met.
7.2 Resource Constraints
In this section, we evaluate the resource usage of FoundIoT on Raspberry Pi 3.
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Usually, smart home devices are designed to perform a limited set of simple
actions. That is why, device manufacturers equip them with limited processing
power (CPU) and memory (RAM). To be properly supported by resource constrained
devices, we need to ensure that our solution operates efficiently and does not
generate too much overload. In this section, we evaluate the performance of
FoundIoT execution.
Some popular IoT boards are presented in Table 7.1. As we can see, all boards
provide a limited amount of resources. Raspberry Pi 3 is the most computationally
powerful device with 1.2 GHz CPU and 1 GB of RAM. In contrast, Tessel 2 is the
least powerful device among presented. It is equipped with only 580 GHz CPU
and 64 MB of RAM.
Board CPU RAM Disk
Tessel 2 [16] MediaTek MT7620n 580 MHz 64 MB 32 MB
C.H.I.P [32] Allwinner R8 1 GHz 512 MB 4 GB
Intel Edison [33] Atom Silvermont 500 MHz 1 GB 4 GB
Udoo Neo [34] ARM Cortex A9 1 GHz 1 GB up to 256 GB
Raspberry Pi 3 [11] ARM Cortex A53 1.2GHz 1 GB up to 256 GB
Table 7.1. Specifications of IoT Boards
The most resource consuming components of FoundIoT are WiFi and Bluetooth
context monitors and Ownership Change Detection. The amount of data stored
to analyze by Ownership Change Detection component depends on the number
of discovered devices by WiFi and Bluetooth context monitor components. The
captured data that is used for evaluation was recorded in environments with
different number of wireless devices. Thus, we evaluate the central processor and
memory usage required by FoundIoT .
The experiment setup consists of three main parts: the Raspberry Pi 3 as an IoT
testbed device, implementation of FoundIoT on the testbed device and the chosen
environment.
We evaluate CPU and RAM usage of traffic capturing component of FoundIoT
in a crowded environment with a large number of active wireless devices in the
device vicinity (Computer Science Department building of Aalto University). In
general, smart home devices are located in less crowded environments with a
lower number of devices.
We present resource usage of FoundIoT only in a very crowded environment to
show an extreme case of high system load on the IoT device. During one week of
periodic scans, the system detected 713 STAs, 77 APs and 604 Bluetooth devices.
Other environments will show approximately the same or lower load.
We measure CPU and RAM usage of WiFi and Bluetooth context monitors com-
ponent periodically, every 2 minutes during execution, using ps utility [35]. Table
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7.2 presents the acquired measurements for monitor components of FoundIoT .
WiFi mon. Bluetooth mon.
STA AP Bluetooth
CPU usage, % 0.05%± 0.01% 0.05%± 0.01% 1.86%± 0.23%
RAM usage, % 0.28%± 0.04% 0.18%± 0.02% 0.89%± 0.03%
RAM average usage, MB 2.6 MB 1.6 MB 8.3 MB
Table 7.2. CPU and RAM usage of FoundIoT monitor components on the Raspberry Pi 3
Another component of FoundIoT , which needs to be evaluated, is Ownership
Change Detection. We evaluate CPU and RAM usage in the same crowded en-
vironment where data capture was measured. Table 7.3 presents the acquired
measurements for the Ownership Change Detection component of FoundIoT .
WiFi con. analysis Bluetooth con. analysis
STA AP Bluetooth
CPU av. usage, % 0.38%± 0.06% 0.35%± 0.02% 0.43%± 0.05%
RAM usage, % 0.67%± 0.05% 0.54%± 0.03% 0.48%± 0.02%
RAM av. usage, MB 6.2 MB 4.9 MB 4.4 MB
Table 7.3. CPU and RAM usage of FoundIoT Ownership Change Detection component on the
Raspberry Pi 3
As a result, the maximum total memory consumption of FoundIoT is 28 MB.
Figure 7.1 presents persistent storage usage of periodic network scans performed
by FoundIoT during one week in the same location, Aalto CS building. As we
can see from the figure, the system requires approximately 1 MB of persistent
storage to store the data captured during a week of scans. FoundIoT disk space
requirements are compliant with presented IoT boards in Table 7.1.
Figure 7.1. FoundIoT persistent storage usage over 1 week of scans
Thus, the minimum specification for supporting FoundIoT is 32 MB of RAM
and 16 MB of persistent storage. The total FoundIoT resource usage does not
create a significant overhead to any of IoT boards presented in Table 7.1. It can be
integrated to a wide range of IoT devices without consuming a noticeable amount
of resources and creating an overhead.
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As a result, we can state that the prototype implementation of FoundIoT can
operate on IoT devices with limited resources and does not cause high system load.
Requirement R2 is fully met.
7.3 Performance
In this section, we evaluate the system performance by addressing two require-
ments. First, we determine ownership change scenarios and evaluate the accuracy
requirement R3.1 by computing true positive and false positive rates to find opti-
mal detection parameters. Second, we evaluate the speed requirement R3.2 by
comparing speed of detection with Jaccard Index and KL Divergence metrics.
7.3.1 Ownership Change Scenarios Description
In this section, we present different scenarios that need to be supported to detect
ownership change accurately. We used different IoT devices for testing FoundIoT
detection accuracy in ownership change scenarios. Table 7.4 presents IoT devices
and their identifiers used for scenario implementation.
Testing environment IoT device Identifier
1
Netatmo Thermostat #1 IoT 1.1
Xiaomi Gateway #1 IoT 1.2
Mobile Alerts Weather Station #1 IoT 1.3
eWeLink Smart Socket #1 IoT 1.4
Broadlink Environment Sensor #1 IoT 1.5
2
Netatmo Thermostat #2 IoT 2.1
Xiaomi Gateway #2 IoT 2.2
Mobile Alerts Weather Station #2 IoT 2.3
eWeLink Smart Socket #2 IoT 2.4
Broadlink Environment Sensor #2 IoT 2.5
Table 7.4. IoT devices identifiers used in ownership change scenarios
Each figure that represents a scenario depicts two distinct environments with
a local network (Local Network) and a set of external WiFi networks (Ext. Net.)
that operate in the IoT device vicinity.
FoundIoT performs the analysis of three time series TSSTA, TSAP and TSBluetooth
to detect ownership change. TSSTA and TSAP contain two subsets that represent
local and external STA and AP contexts similarity. These subsets provide time
series with Jaccard Index or KL Divergence similarity scores, which are evaluated
to detect ownership change.
Next, we present the description of ownership change scenarios that FoundIoT
needs to support for accurate detection of the IoT device ownership change.
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Scenario 1 Selling IoT device to a person that lives in a different house.
During the IoT device life cycle, it could be sold to a different person, a new
owner, or it can be stolen by an adversary. Usually, a new owner lives in
a different environment, which implies a completely different IoT device
context. An example scheme of such scenario is depicted in Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2 shows two testing environments without shared devices, which
implies the IoT device relocation to a new owner’s environment.
Figure 7.2. Scenario 1 - Selling device or the device theft (new owner in a different location).
Scenario 2 Selling IoT device to a person that lives in vicinity of the previous
owner (neighbor).
This scenario describes a less common IoT device selling situation. In this
case, a new owner lives close to the previous owner, an adjacent apartment.
An example scheme of the scenario is depicted in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3 shows two environments with shared devices in external STA and
AP contexts due to their close location.
Scenario 3 Selling smart home with an integrated IoT device.
Another ownership change scenario happens in case of selling a smart home
with integrated IoT device. An example scheme is depicted in Figure 7.4.
In the previously discussed scenarios, the IoT device is taken from one
environment and placed in another. This scenario implies changes in context
without changing the location of the IoT device itself.
Figure 7.4 shows two environments with shared devices in local contexts due
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Figure 7.3. Scenario 2 - Selling IoT device to a neighbor.
Figure 7.4. Scenario 3 - Selling smart home with integrated IoT device
to devices that were left by the previous owner and the external contexts
because the location of the IoT device has not changed.
Next, we present Jaccard Index metric observations for each analyzed context in
ownership change scenarios 1-3.
In the first scenario, FoundIoT does detect any previously discovered devices
that represented the previous owner’s context after the ownership change. A new
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owner has completely different devices that are connected to his WiFi network,
which indicates significant contextual changes within the local network. External
WiFi networks also have completely different devices, compared to the previous
owner’s external context.
Figures 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7 present the observation of Jaccard Index metric over one
week of scans for Scenario 1. Figure 7.5 illustrates the observation for TSSTA by
showing a chart with two lines: blue - for representing similarity of local context,
orange - in external context. Figure 7.5 shows a drop in similarity for local and
external contexts during the 580th scan. The drop is caused by change of device
location to a different environment. The ownership change happened when the
similarity for both contexts experienced a significant drop.
Figures 7.6 and 7.7 illustrate the system analysis results for TSAP and TSBluetooth
using Jaccard Index metric. The metric can clearly distinguish two environments
by showing continuous zero percent similarity in the transition area.
Figure 7.5. Scenario 1. TSSTA observation by Jaccard Index metric (ownership changed during the
580th scan).
Figure 7.6. Scenario 1. TSAP observation by Jaccard Index metric (ownership changed during the
81st scan).
Figures 7.8, 7.9 and 7.10 present the observation of Jaccard Index metric over
one week of scans in case of Scenario 2. As Figure 7.8 illustrates, the Jaccard
Index metric can differ previous and new owner’s local contexts by showing a
significant drop during 580th scan.
However, the previous and new owner’s external contexts have shared devices,
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Figure 7.7. Scenario 1. TSBluetooth observation by Jaccard Index metric (ownership changed
during the 470th scan).
because of their close location. Jaccard Index metric does not show a significant
drop in Figure 7.8, as there are previously discovered devices along with some new
ones after ownership change.
Figures 7.8 - 7.10 show clear distinction in local contexts in two different environ-
ments. This distinction is caused by different devices that are connected to local
networks in both environments. On the contrary, Jaccard Index metric analysis
shows resemblance in external WiFi and Bluetooth contexts without significant
drops in similarity. Similarity between these contexts is present because of close
location of the environments.
Figure 7.8. Scenario 2. TSSTA observation by Jaccard Index metric (ownership changed during the
580th scan).
Figure 7.9. Scenario 2. TSAP observation by Jaccard Index metric (ownership changed during the
96th scan).
Figures 7.11, 7.12 and 7.13 present the observation of Jaccard Index metric for
Scenario 3.
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Figure 7.10. Scenario 2. TSBluetooth observation by Jaccard Index metric (ownership changed
during the 370th scan).
Jaccard Index metric shows some changes in local context in Figure 7.11, as
a new owner connects new devices to the local network during the 460th scan.
Meanwhile, there are no significant changes in external context, as the location of
the IoT device did not change.
Figure 7.11 depicts Jaccard Index metric observations for TSSTA for Scenario 3.
As we can see, the metric did not observe a significant drop in context similarity,
as there were still previously detected devices in the network.
FoundIoT supports Scenario 3 by implementing the multi-stage detection scheme.
In case ownership change is not detected by analyzing TSSTA, the system will try to
detect contextual changes in TSAP . Figure 7.12 shows Jaccard Index observations
for TSAP . The metric shows significant drop during the 98th scan after a new
owner connects to a new WiFi access point.
Figure 7.11. Scenario 3. TSSTA observation by Jaccard Index metric (ownership changed during
the 460th scan).
Figure 7.12. Scenario 3. TSAP observation by Jaccard Index metric (ownership changed during
the 98th scan).
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Figure 7.13. Scenario 3. TSBluetooth observation by Jaccard Index metric (ownership changed
during the 370th scan).
7.3.2 Accuracy Evaluation
As it was previously stated in Section 5.3, values of detection threshold ∆similarity
and window W affect the system accuracy. We evaluate accuracy in terms of TPR
and FPR. According to requirement R3.1, the system needs to detect ownership
change with at least 95% accuracy and false positive rate lower than 1%.
We produce experimental data from two datasets of collected contexts that
represent two distinct environments described in Ownership Change Scenarios.
Each dataset consists of 7 days of scans. We mix the days to achieve several
consecutive ownership changes. The resulted experimental dataset is depicted
in Figure 7.14. Each pair of days represent ownership change. As a result, the
system needs to detect 13 consecutive ownership changes to achieve the highest
accuracy.
Figure 7.14. Experimental Data Generation
For example, Figure 7.15 presents FoundIoT accuracy evaluation for TSSTA
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in case of Scenario 1 using Jaccard Index metric. Blue labels specify the used
detection threshold for local context similarity and window, red labels - detection
threshold for external context similarity and window. As we can see, each combi-
nation of detection threshold and window has a unique impact on system accuracy.
The system achieves the highest accuracy with TPR of 100% and FPR of 0% using
the window W of 12 scans and 0.7 and 0.3 as the values of detection thresholds for
local and external context similarity, respectively.
Figure 7.15. Scenario 1. Accuracy Evaluation for TSSTA using Jaccard Index in terms of TPR and
FPR
Table 7.5 presents the highest accuracy values of FoundIoT detection using
Jaccard Index achieved in case of each ownership change scenario.
Analyzed TS 1st scenario 2nd scenario 3rd scenario
TSSTAloc
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
12 scans (1h43m)
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
12 scans (1h43m)
TPR:72%, FPR:22%
12 scans (1h43m)
TSSTAext
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
12 scans (1h43m)
TPR:82%, FPR:14%
12 scans (1h43m)
TPR:73%, FPR:23%
12 scans (1h43m)
TSAPloc
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
9 scans (1h6m)
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
9 scans (1h6m)
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
9 scans (1h6m)
TSAPext
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
9 scans (1h6m)
TPR:78%, FPR:1%
9 scans (1h6m)
TPR:72%, FPR:2%
9 scans (1h6m)
TSBluetooth
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
10 scans (1h24m)
TPR:79%, FPR:14%
10 scans (1h24m)
TPR:70%, FPR:20%
10 scans (1h24m)
Table 7.5. Performance Evaluation of FoundIoT Detection Using Jaccard Index Metric for
Analyzed TS
Jaccard Index metric shows the highest accuracy with TPR of 100% and FPR of
0% for each TS with similarity scores for each analyzed context in case of Scenario
1. To achieve the highest accuracy for each TS, Jaccard Index metric requires
12 scans, which takes 1 hour 43 minutes. Jaccard Index metric is able to detect
ownership change very accurately because of completely different environments
that represent Scenario 1. As a result, Jaccard Index metric can detect changes
in the IoT device WiFi and Bluetooth contexts in Scenario 1 and achieves the
accuracy required by R3.1.
In case of Scenario 2, Jaccard Index metric provides the highest accuracy with
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TPR of 100% and FPR of 0% only for TSSTAloc and TSAPloc because of different
local WiFi networks of the previous and new owners and no overlap in the devices
that are connected to them. Jaccard Index metric requires a window of 12 scans to
achieve the required accuracy, which takes 1 hour 43 minutes. In case of TSSTAext ,
TSAPext and TSBluetooth, Jaccard Index metric achieves lower accuracy with TPR of
78% - 82% and FPR of 1% - 14% because of overlap in the devices that are located
in the IoT device vicinity due to close location of the new owner in Scenario 2. As
a result, we can rely only on Jaccard Index metric values for local WiFi (TSSTAloc
and TSAPloc) context to achieve the accuracy required by R3.1.
Finally, in case of Scenario 3, Jaccard Index metric achieves the highest accuracy
with TPR of 100% and FPR of 0% only for TSAPloc because of a new AP in the local
network. The requried accuracy is achieved by using a window of 9 scans, which
takes 1 hour 6 minutes. Lower accuracy values with TPR of 70% - 73% and FPR
of 2% - 23% for other time series are caused by a large overlap in devices from
the previous owner and new owner contexts due to unchanged location of the IoT
device. As a result, Jaccard Index metric provides the accuracy required by R3.1
only for TSAPloc .
To conclude Jaccard Index metric accuracy evaluation, we can state that it
achieves the accuracy required by R3.1 only for TSAPloc in each scenario. Analysis
of other time series provides lower accuracy due to an overlap in the previous
owner and new owner contexts. As a result, to detect ownership change accurately
using Jaccard Index metric, we need to use TSAPloc and disregard other contexts.
Next, we present the evaluation of FoundIoT detection accuracy using KL Di-
vergence. Table 7.6 presents achieved accuracy values in case of each ownership
change scenario.
Analyzed TS 1st scenario 2nd scenario 3rd scenario
TSSTAloc
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
9 scans (1h6m)
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
9 scans (1h6m)
TPR:74%, FPR:19%
9 scans (1h6m)
TSSTAext
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
9 scans (1h6m)
TPR:83%, FPR:12%
9 scans (1h6m)
TPR:75%, FPR:21%
9 scans (1h6m)
TSAPloc
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
7 scans (48m)
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
7 scans (48m)
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
7 scans (48m)
TSAPext
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
7 scans (48m)
TPR:76%, FPR:1%
7 scans (48m)
TPR:75%, FPR:2%
7 scans (48m)
TSBluetooth
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
8 scans (57m)
TPR:75%, FPR:11%
8 scans (57m)
TPR:73%, FPR:18%
8 scans (57m)
Table 7.6. Performance Evaluation of FoundIoT Detection Using KL Divergence Metric for
Analyzed TS
As we can see from Table 7.6, KL Divergence metric achieves similar accuracy
values to Jaccard Index. It achieves the accuracy required by R3.1 only for TSAPloc
in each scenario. For other contexts, KL Divergence shows lower accuracy and
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does not reach required accuracy. The main advantage of KL Divergence is that it
requires a lower window of scans to achieve the required accuracy compared to
Jaccard Index, which leads to the increase in detection speed by 25-30 minutes on
average for each analyzed context.
To conclude the accuracy evaluation, we can state that the system meets the
requirement R3.1 for each ownership change scenario using Jaccard Index and
KL Divergence metrics when analyzing TSAPloc , which represents the similarity
of local APs in the IoT device vicinity. Both metrics show worse accuracy when
analyzing other contexts due to overlap in discovered devices and cannot be used
for ownership change detection as they do not meet requirement R3.1.
7.3.3 Speed Evaluation
The speed of ownership change detection depends on the parameter W , which
sets the window of consecutive scans with similarity metric lower than ∆similarity.
Delays in detection speed lead to the increase of the window for an attack to occur.
The current implementation of FoundIoT sets a delay of 10 minutes between the
scans. The final value of detection speed includes this delay. Different values of
window W cause a unique impact on the accuracy of detection. For example, Figure
7.16 presents the speed comparison chart with detection speed using Jaccard Index
and KL Divergence metrics for TSSTA in Scenario 1. KL Divergence shows higher
detection speed by 37 minutes compared to Jaccard Index.
Figure 7.16. Scenario 1. Detection speed comparison of Jaccard Index and KL Divergence metrics
for TSSTA. The speed of detection is 1 hour 43 minutes and 1 hour 6 minutes for
Jaccard Index and KL Divergence metrics, respectively.
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 present the highest speed values achieved in each ownership
change scenario. In case of Scenario 1, Jaccard Index and KL Divergence metrics
require 12 (1 hour 43 minutes) and 9 (1 hour 6 minutes) consecutive scans to
achieve TPR of 100% and FPR of 0% for TSSTA analysis, respectively. In case
TSAP analysis, Jaccard Index metric and KL Divergence require 9 (1 hour 6
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minutes) and 7 (48 minutes) scans, respectively. And finally, in case of TSBluetooth
analysis, Jaccard Index metric and KL Divergence require 10 (1 hour 24 minutes)
and 8 (48 minutes) scans, respectively. As a result, KL Divergence provides higher
detection speed than Jaccard Index, which allows the system to detect ownership
change faster.
For Scenario 2, Jaccard Index and KL Divergence metrics provide the same
speed values as for Scenario 1. Jaccard Index and KL Divergence metrics require
12 (1 hour 43 minutes) and 9 (1 hour 6 minutes) consecutive scans for TSSTA, 9 (1
hour 6 minutes) and 7 (48 minutes) scans for TSAP , and 10 (1 hour 24 minutes)
and 8 (57 minutes) scans for TSBluetooth, respectively. The speed values that are
provided by KL Divergence metric are consistently higher compared to Jaccard
Index.
Finally, for Scenario 3, Jaccard Index and KL Divergence metrics provide con-
sistent speed values as for the previously evaluated scenarios. KL Divergence
metric provides higher speed compared to Jaccard Index for each analyzed context.
However, the achieved detection speed does not meet requirement R3.2.
As a result, we can state that KL Divergence provides higher detection speed
compared to Jaccard Index by 25-30 minutes on average for all analyzed contexts
in each scenario. However, the current implementation does not meet requirement
R3.2 that was set in Section 3.3.
7.4 Re-evaluation using AP Detection technique
Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 presented the accuracy and speed evaluation of the
current implementation of FoundIoT . According to the gathered results, FoundIoT
achieves the highest accuracy with TPR of 100% and FPR of 0% and highest speed
of 48 minutes using KL Divergence metric. However, it does not meet the speed
requirement set in Section 3.3 due to delay of 10 minutes between the scans and
the multi-stage ownership change detection scheme.
According to accuracy evaluation presented in Section 7.3.2, TSAPloc provides
the highest accuracy in each examined scenario. That is why, we have limited the
ownership change detection scheme with AP Detection technique. In this section,
we re-evaluate the system performance by making new experiments.
7.4.1 Experiment setup
The setup is composed of our IoT testbed device connected to a WiFi AP, which is
called local, and external APs. The testbed device invokes iwlist utility to scan
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for APs in its vicinity periodically, each 30 seconds. Each scan takes on average 3
seconds. As a result, each scan generates two time series: local and external APs.
The scans are performed in different locations to check the system performance
for all ownership change scenarios described in Section 7.3.1.
We also change the number of scans used for generation of set of previously
discovered devices Setprev. Setprev is used in the computation of the similarity
score by Jaccard Index and KL Divergence metrics. In the initial implementation
evaluated in Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3, we generate Setprev based on all prior scans.
In our new experiment setup, we use only 10 previous scans to generate Setprev.
7.4.2 Accuracy Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the system detection accuracy.
As it was mentioned earlier in Section 5.3, the accuracy of detection depends
on two parameters: detection threshold ∆similarity and window W . To evaluate
the accuracy of KL Divergence metric, we use the approach described earlier in
Section 7.3.2 to generate experimental dataset with mixed data from different
contexts.
For example, Figures 7.17 and 7.18 present the accuracy and speed evaluation
of FoundIoT detection for Scenario 3. The system reaches the highest accuracy
with TPR of 70% and FPR of 1% for TSAPext in 3 scans, which takes 1 minute 39
seconds. KL Divergence cannot identify changes in the IoT device TSAPext context
accurately due to unchanged location of the IoT device, which leads to low TPR
values.
The system meets requirement R3.2; however, it does not meet requirement
R3.1 due to low TPR values. As a result, this means that KL Divergence for
TSAPext can be used as a supplementary technique for detection of ownership
change.
Table 7.7 presents the highest accuracy values of FoundIoT detection using
KL Divergence achieved in case of each ownership change scenario in our new
experiment.
Analyzed TS 1st scenario 2nd scenario 3rd scenario
TSAPloc
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
1 scan (33sec)
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
1 scan (33sec)
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
1 scan (33sec)
TSAPext
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
1 scan (33sec)
TPR:100%, FPR:0%
2 scans (1min6sec)
TPR:70%, FPR:1%
3 scans (1min39sec)
Table 7.7. Performance Evaluation of FoundIoT Detection Using KL Divergence Metric for TSAPloc
and TSAPext
KL Divergence metric reaches the accuracy required by R3.1 in all ownership
change scenarios. However, due to unchanged location of the IoT device and
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Figure 7.17. Scenario 3. Detection Threshold and Window Parameters Evaluation for
TSAPextusing KL Divergence metric.
Figure 7.18. Scenario 3. Detection speed evaluation using KL Divergence metric for TSAPext .
large overlap of devices that belong to the previous and new owner contexts, KL
Divergence cannot accurately identify difference in the external contexts TSAPext
in Scenario 3 and reaches only TPR of 70% and FPR of 1%. For TSAPloc , KL
Divergence provides the required accuracy because of different APs used by the
previous owner and a new owner. As a result, we can use external and local
TSAP for ownership change detection because both of them does not cause FPR
higher than 1% as required by R3.1. In case the system does not detect ownership
change in the external context, it switches to the local context, which provides the
required TPR.
It is worth mentioning that in our new experiment, KL Divergence is able to
achieve the required accuracy with a significantly higher speed. This can be
explained by the reduced number of scans used for generation of Setprev. Thus, KL
Divergence performs better on sets with the lower number of devices and achieves
the required accuracy under 2 minutes.
As a result, we can state KL Divergence metric provides the accuracy required
by R3.1 in each ownership change scenario.
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7.4.3 Speed evaluation
The evaluation of accuracy presented in Section 7.4.2 showed that KL Divergence
metric can detect ownership change with highest accuracy using the window of 3
scans. Due to delay of 30 seconds between the scans, the lowest speed of FoundIoT
detection is 1 minute 39 seconds, which satisfies our speed requirement R3.2.
As a result, we can state the described technique fully meets the requirement
R3.2.
7.5 Security
7.5.1 MAC Address Spoofing
One of security issues of the current approach is related to MAC address spoofing
attack. FoundIoT detects and identifies wireless context in the device vicinity
during capturing phase. The identification is based on MAC address of device
network card. This information could be easily spoofed by an adversary.
One possible solution for MAC address spoofing is device fingerprinting. J.
Franklin et al. [36] described a passive device driver fingerprinting technique that
is based on different network card 802.11 implementations by vendors. With the
use of developed technique, authors were able to reliably identify 802.11 chipsets
and even specific version of network card driver. The authors’ general idea of
the fingerprinting relies on different IEEE 802.11 [6] implementations by device
manufacturers, which could lead to the identification of a device driver, firmware
or even user applications that use the network channel. 802.11 implementation
implies an active scanning procedure, which is used by a device to scan its vicinity
for an AP. A device sends a specific management frame called the probe request.
If an AP is compatible with the scan parameters of a device, it sends a probe re-
sponse to acknowledge received request. Due to different 802.11 implementations,
devices from different vendors send management frames with varying frequency.
This feature helps to differentiate the device vendor. One of the most important
features of 802.11 fingerprinting is that the implementation is mainly controlled
by hardware. It means that in most cases it is impossible to mimic a network
card 802.11 implementation and spoof the context by an adversary. However, the
fingerprinting approach cannot be used for our system, as it requires scans with a
long duration to collect statistical data for accurate fingerprint generation. This
prevents the system from respecting the speed requirement R3.2.
Sheng et al. [37] and Chen et al. [38] proposed solutions that analyze the signal
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strength of the monitored station. The algorithm detects a spoofed station based
on the difference of signal strength of reply frames sent back from the genuine and
spoofed stations. This approach is feasible for the IoT device ownership change
scenario as it does not require a lot of scans to identify the signal strength of
nearby wireless stations.
Bharti et al. [39] proposes a security association approach for MAC address
spoofing prevention. The idea implies sharing a secret key that is associated with
a specific AP. During data transmission, the AP sends a packet that is encrypted
using the secret key to the node. In case the node cannot decrypt the packet,
the AP is assumed to be fake. This approach is more secure than the previously
described techniques as an adversary does not know the pre-shared secret and
cannot spoof the AP. However, it requires more computational power because
it involves encryption. This approach can be used for the IoT device ownership
change scenario to ensure the authenticity of the local AP and mitigate MAC
address spoofing attacks.
7.5.2 Ownership Change Detection Delay
FoundIoT involves AP Detection technique to detect ownership change. As it was
shown in Section 7.4.3, FoundIoT is able to detect ownership change with the use
of AP Detection technique with the lowest speed of 1 min 39 seconds.
This technique detects change of the IoT device ownership during its initial con-
figuration, and therefore does not let the device and sensitive information stored on
it become vulnerable to attacks from an adversary. Mitigation of adversary actions
is very important, as he has full control over the device during ownership change.
An adversary can try to extract previous owner’s sensitive information stored
on the device, which includes account and network credentials, and information
collected by the IoT device during its operation once it is configured.
7.5.3 Susceptibility to Power Cuts
Since most smart home devices do not have their own power source, they are
susceptible to power cuts. In such cases, devices stop operating and turn off com-
pletely. Upon power restoration, the device re-initializes itself. Re-initialization
includes initiating detection of ownership change, restoring Internet connection,
and connecting to the control device.
In case of power cut during operation of FoundIoT , the execution will be contin-
ued as soon as power is restored. If the monitor component completes its scan, the
collected contextual information will be saved and used for analysis during next
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iteration. If the detection condition is respected during the scan after power is
restored, the system will transfer the control to chownIoT for secure data handling.
While the IoT device is turned off, an adversary can try to launch a physical
attack to manipulate the collected context saved on the IoT device storage and
disrupt the detection technique. Currently, there is no direct protection against
physical attacks. One possible solution to mitigate this attack is computation of
checksums for saved contexts. In case the system detects the checksum mismatch,
it initiates the secure data handling by chownIoT.
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8. Related work
Recently, several researchers have focused on ensuring sensitive information
privacy and providing security improvements for IoT devices. Our proposed
solution is primarily focused on detecting change of IoT device ownership by
registering context changes to further ensure the privacy of sensitive data stored
on smart home devices.
We organize Chapter 8 in the following way: Section 8.1 discusses alternative
solutions that provide smart home device privacy. In Section 8.2, we discuss
research works related to context aware security.
8.1 Smart Home Device Privacy
The prevalence of smart home devices is increasing exponentially, which allows
to execute daily routines more conveniently. However, it is also introducing
new unique challenges for preserving the owner’s privacy in the smart home
environment. Therefore, recent studies have been focusing on ensuring privacy of
smart home device owners. Several of these works are described below.
Song et al. [40] proposed a solution that helps to preserve privacy during
communication between smart home appliances and the control device. The
authors mainly focused on eavesdropping prevention from an outside adversary
by proposing a secure communication protocol for smart home devices. In the
proposed protocol, data is encrypted before the transfer to achieve confidentiality.
To ensure data integrity, the protocol appends Message Authentication Code (MAC)
to messages for detection of tampering and data modification by an adversary.
Finally, the protocol uses MAC for two-way authentication. Smart home devices
ensure that a received message comes from a certain control device and a control
device can prove that a message comes from a legitimate smart home device. As
a result, authors described an architecture for a smart home system to ensure
user’s data security and privacy. However, the proposed solution does not cover
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situations of ownership change. If the smart home device is sold to a different
owner or stolen, the previous owner’s sensitive information will be accessible to a
new owner or an adversary.
Sivaraman et al. [41], Liu et al. [42] and Yoshigoe et al. [43] studied the oper-
ation of popular smart home appliances, identified several security and privacy
issues, and proposed an approach for improving security system of the smart home
device and mitigating privacy threats. The solution operates on the network level
and blocks any suspicious activities for the current environment. It provides a
capability to the owner to specify a set of permitted actions for a certain environ-
ment. The system can either grant or prohibit an action, which the device tries
to execute, based on the current environment. However, the proposed solutions
do not take into account ownership change situations, which introduce unique
challenges to preserve data privacy.
Lee et al. [44] presented a different approach for preserving privacy for smart
home devices based on a cloud platform. The proposed solution describes a special
node, central home controller, that provides data-hiding and data analytical access
control capabilities in the cloud. The system enables easy access and understand-
ing for users and manufacturers that collect diagnostic data about the device
operation for service improvement. Therefore, it ensures device owner’s privacy
and data availability for manufacturers. However, authors do not examine issues
related to change in the smart home device ownership. The proposed solution does
not provide mechanisms for preserving privacy in case the owner of the device has
changed or the device was stolen. Home central controller will reveal information
stored in its memory or the cloud storage to an adversary or a new owner.
The described works are ensuring privacy of smart home device owner without
considering privacy issues during ownership change. The solutions that focus
on preserving data privacy for IoT devices need to act differently based on their
context as most IoT smart home devices are portable and can be easily taken to
a different location by an adversary. On the contrary, our solution is focused on
addressing privacy issues related to ownership change of smart home devices to
further ensure privacy of data stored on the IoT device.
8.2 Context Aware Security
During the last 10 years, the number of mobile devices and their adoption rate
have been constantly increasing. These devices include smartphones, tablets,
smart watches and smart home IoT devices. These devices are equipped with a
variety of different sensor modalities that can detect their context.
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The contextual information can be used for various tasks and provide context
aware services. Some services provide security solutions that use contextual
information to improve security of IoT devices. Some of the recent research works
focused on context aware security are presented below.
The idea of providing context based access control has been a rather popular area
of research in recent years. Several works have described techniques for applying
context to provide access control. Wullems et al. [45] proposed an authorization
architecture for providing access control to resources based on host context, such as
its location, network topology, host security (OS patches, firewall rules, filesystem
permissions). Chung et al. [46] suggested a context-aware security model based
on user and network environment changes. In [47], Hu et al. developed a context-
aware framework for health care systems that is aimed to provide access control to
hospital resources based on user context and trust level assigned by the hospital
administrator. Shebaro et al. [48] and Das et al. [49] introduced similar solutions
that provide access control based on user’s location and his activities. The proposed
systems monitor access requests from applications on a mobile device and grants
or deny access using rule policy for the current context. In [50], Cantali et
al. presented a context-aware security system for providing Internet access.
The authors include properties, such as wireless security protocols, encryption
algorithms, user’s location and authentication protocols, for context identification.
As a result, the security system rates wireless networks in uncontrolled public
spaces with a low assessment criteria, which does not let the mobile device to
connect to them. Satoh [51] introduced a model for context-aware access control
executed on the cloud computing side. The model treats user’s location as the
primary factor for providing access to control smart home appliances only for
residents that are located in the same room with them. Gupta et al. [52] proposed
a context-based framework for access control. The proposed solution collects GPS,
Bluetooth and WiFi data to detect current context and computes its familiarity
and safety scores. The context-based framework has been integrated with a
device locking application. The software is able to accurately detect contextual
changes and adjust the safety level accordingly. Covington et al. [53] described an
advanced model for securing context-aware environments and providing flexible
access control. The model supports context-aware authorization, which means that
access could be restricted based on contextual factors, such as subject’s location,
room temperature or the time of day. Another feature of the model is related to
non-intrusive user authentication based on voice and face recognition.
The concept of non-intrusive user authentication was also discussed by Truong
et al. [20] when developing a context-aware zero-interaction authentication (ZIA).
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ZIA refers to an approach that supports user authentication without any inter-
action with a verifier (terminal). The authors used different sensor modalities
(WiFi, Bluetooth, GPS and audio) for device and verifier co-presence detection
and experimentally proved that WiFi is the module that provides the most ef-
fective resistance to relay attacks. The major contributions of the paper are the
context detection evaluation of different sensor modalities and the use of multiple
modalities to improve resilience against relay attacks without degrading usability.
Ashibani et al. [54] introduced a context-aware authentication framework for
smart home environment. The proposed solution treats contextual information,
such as user’s location, profile and request time to grant or deny access. The frame-
work provides user authentication in a non-intrusive manner, it bases completely
on contextual information without requiring the user to provide credentials.
Previously mentioned works focused on authentication and authorization tasks
to either control access to a resource or ensure authenticity of the user. In contrast,
Al-Rabiaah et al. [55] described a mechanism that validates the device sensor
(context collector) and ensures integrity of collected context information.
Besides access control and user authentication, in another work, Harb et al.
[56] proposed a solution for secure group key management based on contextual
information. The main motivation for the proposed solution is IoT devices re-
source constraints. Due to limited resources, authors suggest to rely on multicast
communication to transmit data to several receivers. To secure the transmission,
the data needs to be encrypted. The proposed solution shares the group key used
by sender and the receivers based on collected context on each communication
member. The contextual information includes wireless network details (WiFi, 3G,
Zigbee), device geographical location and the multicast group to join.
All previously mentioned works use context to provide access control, user
authentication, authorization or to establish secure communication and eventually
improve device security. In our work, we use contextual information to detect
change of the IoT device ownership. None of the works prior ours have used context
of a device to detect change of its ownership. The use of contextual information to
detect ownership change provides the capability to a smart home device to take
necessary security measures and ensure data privacy automatically.
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9. Conclusions
9.1 Summary of Contributions
Automatic ownership change detection system: We have presented a system
called FoundIoT that detects ownership change of the IoT device based on con-
textual changes. The proposed solution uses the device WiFi sensor modality for
context identification. It associates changes of the collected device context with
change of its ownership.
Data mining techniques: We have developed and presented data mining tech-
niques based on Jaccard Index and KL Divergence metrics that are applied to the
collected wireless communication data. FoundIoT relies on these techniques for
ownership change detection.
A prototype implementation: We have presented a prototype implementation
of the proposed system. We have used the Raspberry Pi board for deploying
the system and evaluating its performance. The system operates completely
autonomously on the device and does not require any additional external depen-
dencies.
The implementation also helps identifying practical requirements and overall
system performance.
Evaluation: We have provided the system performance evaluation, by measuring
speed and accuracy of the IoT device ownership change detection. The imple-
mented prototype is able to detect ownership change with high accuracy and low
number of false alarms. The system can achieve TPR of 100% and FPR of 1% with
speed up to 1 minute 39 seconds. High speed of ownership change detection helps
the system to mitigate adversary attacks to some extent. However, the current
implementation is vulnerable to MAC address spoofing attack. This problem
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has been discussed by several works and lightweight solutions were proposed to
mitigate this attack.
9.2 Future work
Protection against spoofing: The current implementation of FoundIoT relies on
context identification using WiFi communication channel. The system captures
MAC addresses of active APs in the vicinity of the IoT device. As it was discussed
in Section 7.5.1, these readings can be spoofed by an adversary to manipulate
the context. Therefore, mitigation of this security fault is one of the main future
development directions for the project.
One of the techniques that should not create system overload and significantly
decrease the speed of ownership change detection is device fingerprinting. This
technique is based on the device specific features that cannot be spoofed.
Developing a communication protocol with chownIoT: Currently, FoundIoT oper-
ates independently and provides a response of whether ownership change was
detected or not. To ensure sensitive data privacy on the IoT device during own-
ership change, we need to develop a communication protocol for FoundIoT and
chownIoT.
The protocol needs to provide a capability to FoundIoT to communicate with
chownIoT when ownership change of the IoT device is detected. As a result, chown-
IoT needs to activate ownership change management, which includes ensuring
privacy of the previous owner’s sensitive information with encryption, preparing
the device for using by a new owner and restoring the context when the device is
returned to the previous owner.
The complete system deployment on the IoT testbed device: Currently, both com-
ponents of the complete system, FoundIoT and chownIoT, have a prototype im-
plementation on the testbed IoT device based on the Raspberry Pi board. Both
components have been individually evaluated in terms of their system load and per-
formance. It has been shown that each component operates effectively. However,
we need to ensure the complete system performance.
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